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Abstract
Since 1997, the Criminal Cases Review Commission of Eng-
land, Wales and Northern Ireland has served as a state-fun-
ded post-conviction body to consider claims of wrongful
conviction for those who have exhausted their rights to
appeal. A meticulous organisation that has over its lifetime
referred over 700 cases back to the Court of Appeal, result-
ing in over 60% of those applicants having their convictions
quashed, it is nonetheless restricted in its response to cases
by its own legislation. This shapes its decision-making in
reviewing cases, causing it to be somewhat deferential to
the original jury, to the principle of finality and, most impor-
tantly, to the Court of Appeal, the only institution that can
overturn a wrongful conviction. In mandating such defer-
ence, the legislation causes the Commission to have one eye
on the Court’s evolving jurisprudence but leaves room for
institutional and individual discretion, evidenced in some
variability in responses across the Commission. While con-
siderable variability would be difficult to defend, some
inconsistency raises the prospects for a shift towards a less
deferential referral culture. This article draws on original
research by the author to consider the impact of institutional
deference on the work of the Criminal Cases Review Com-
mission and argues for a slightly bolder approach in its work
Keywords: wrongful conviction, criminal justice, Criminal
Cases Review Commission, Court of Appeal, discretion
1 Introduction
The vast majority of those who believe themselves to be
wrongfully convicted do not find relief from a direct
appeal. While in some countries a failed direct appeal
would mark the end of the road, in England, Wales and
Northern Ireland there is further opportunity for post-
conviction review: the Criminal Cases Review Commis-
sion of England and Wales (‘the Commission’; Scotland
has its own Criminal Cases Review Commission). Over
two decades since its establishment, this article focuses
on that review body, considering its close relationship
with the Court of Appeal.
* Carolyn Hoyle is Professor of Criminology at the Faculty of Law,
University of Oxford, UK.
Following a recommendation of the 1993 Royal Com-
mission on Criminal Justice (known as the ‘Runciman
Commission’),1 the Commission was established in
1997, by Article 8 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995, to
review a sentence or conviction following the exhaustion
of first instance appeals. The first system of regular
appeals against criminal conviction had been introduced
in England and Wales by the Criminal Appeal Act 1907,
which created the Court of Criminal Appeal – the fore-
runner of today’s Court of Appeal established in 1966.
Since 1908, the only further recourse for people convic-
ted of criminal offences, who had been refused leave to
appeal or whose appeals had been dismissed, had been
to apply to the Home Secretary for executive interven-
tion.2 The Criminal Case Unit of the C3 (Criminal Poli-
cy) Division of the Home Office reviewed hundreds of
petitions a year, few with legal representation, and asked
the Home Secretary to refer meritorious cases where
there was fresh evidence back to the Court. The quality
of investigations was poor,3 and subsequent appeals by
referral were rare; just a handful each year.4
At the time, the English criminal justice system clearly
valued the notion of finality.5 Indeed, at the start of the
twentieth century, opposition to the establishment of an
appeal court centred on the risks posed to the finality of
convictions, with critics focusing particularly on the
inappropriateness of judges revising a jury’s verdict
without hearing the actual witnesses themselves.6 The
Criminal Appeal Act 1968 was understood to embrace
the principle of finality of litigation and interpreted as
requiring that only a single appeal against conviction
1. Royal Commission on Criminal Justice. 1993. Report (Cm 2263). Lon-
don.
2. The only other option was to ask the Home Secretary to recommend
that the Queen exercise the Royal Prerogative of Mercy; however, this
provided little solace to those who believed themselves to be innocent
as it started from the premise that the person was guilty.
3. Home Affairs Committee. Miscarriages of Justice: Sixth Report from the
Home Affairs Committee, Session 1981-1982, Together with the Pro-
ceedings of the Committee, the Minutes of Evidence and Appendix
HC421. London (1982).
4. C3 contributed to an annual average of five cases being quashed by the
Court between 1980 and 1992, and before the 1980s references were
even fewer (R. Pattenden, English Criminal Appeals 1844-1994 (1996),
at 363.
5. K. Malleson, ‘Appeals against Conviction and the Principle of Finality’,
21(1) Journal of Law and Society 151-64, at 151 (1994).
6. R. Nobles and D Schiff, ‘Miscarriages of Justice: A Systems Approach’,
58(3) The Modern Law Review 299-320, at 311 (1995).
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was permitted, even when fresh evidence came to light
after an appeal had been dismissed, as was confirmed in
R v. Pinfold.7
Although C3 could refer cases back to the Court –
 indeed it was the only option for those who had already
appealed – over the years that it operated, successive
Home Secretaries demonstrated extreme reluctance to
disturb jury verdicts, and the Court certainly expressed
no inclination to hear more cases. Hence, the Runciman
Commission was keen to establish an independent insti-
tution to review cases where the Court had not provided
relief and the consensus, among even the Commission’s
harshest critics, is that whatever its faults, the Commis-
sion has undoubtedly outperformed C3. That said, the
challenge for any post-conviction review process must
be to balance the principle of finality and deference to
the jury’s decision with opportunities for rigorous post-
conviction review.
This article describes the legislative framework of the
Commission, discusses its work in practice and consid-
ers if it has got this balance right. In particular, it
addresses the key criticism of the Commission, namely
that as a gatekeeper or a filter to the Court, it is in an
essentially dependent, even subordinate position, leav-
ing it in the realm of having to anticipate how the Court
may assess those cases that the Commission believes to
be unsafe and making its referral decisions in light of
this second-guessing.8 It builds on rigorous empirical
research conducted by the author over the past decade,
with much of the empirical data gathered between 2013
and 2016, research that is analysed in greater detail else-
where.9 This focused on analysis of 146 cases: including
examination of Court judgments; interviews with and
surveys of caseworkers, commissioners and others work-
ing on these cases; quantitative analysis of working prac-
tices; and detailed review of Commission policy and
internal guidelines, not publicly available. It considers
these data through a theoretical lens that borrows from
sociolegal scholarship on discretion, in particular,
adopting Keith Hawkins’ concepts of decision-making
‘frames’ that draw on ‘decision fields’ within social,
political and legal ‘surrounds’.10
2 Legal Framework for Post-
Conviction Review
Those who believe themselves to be wrongfully convic-
ted must apply to the Court of Appeal (Criminal Divi-
sion) for leave to appeal,11 and only if leave is granted
7. [1988] B.B. 462.
8. A. James, ‘The Criminal Cases Review Commission: Economy, Effective-
ness and Justice’, Criminal Law Review 140-53 (2000).
9. C. Hoyle and M. Sato, Reasons to Doubt: Wrongful Convictions and
the Criminal Cases Review Commission (2019), at ch. 2.
10. K. Hawkins, Law as Last Resort: Prosecution Decision-Making in a Reg-
ulatory Agency (2002).
11. There are time limits for lodging an appeal (28 days from conviction or
sentence, although applications for extensions can be made), so
will their appeal be heard.12 Appeals may be based on
fresh evidence or a change of law, but in the former
case, the appellant will need to have a good reason for
not adducing this evidence at trial. Where a judge refu-
ses leave to appeal, the appellant can renew his or her
application, but if it is again unsuccessful, there is no
further recourse for direct appeal. Similarly, there is no
further remedy for those whose appeal is heard but con-
viction upheld by the Court of Appeal.
Leave to appeal is granted in only about 10% of approx-
imately 700-800 applications for appeals against convic-
tion each year.13 However, about two-thirds of convic-
tion appeals heard by the Court each year will be
allowed (with those convictions being deemed to be
‘unsafe’ by the Court and therefore quashed). While the
numbers differ each year, over the past five years, only
about 7% of all applications received have been success-
ful.14 Given that forensic science may evolve to provide
new evidence or expose the weak probative value of old
science and that new witnesses may come forward or old
ones may be discredited, a rigorous post-conviction
review process, one that is not bound by strict time lim-
its, is crucial. The Commission provides appellants who
are unsuccessful at direct appeal with an opportunity to
have their conviction reviewed by a rigorous independ-
ent body, the only authority with the power to take their
case back to the Court.
However, while the Commission is expected to be inde-
pendent of the executive and the courts,15 there are lim-
its to its independence. It is unable to quash convictions
itself, having the power only to refer cases back to the
Court for their consideration (though once referred, the
Court is then obliged to hear the appeal). In giving the
Commission power to refer cases to the Court,16
Parliament set the parameters of the legislative test that
was to be applied, the ‘real possibility test’ (Criminal
Appeal Act 1995, section 13(1)(a)). Under this test, the
Commission must be satisfied there is a real possibility
that the Court will quash the trial verdict.17 As the
defence solicitors will usually advise their client on whether there are
reasonable grounds for appeal (and draft those grounds) immediately
after the trial has concluded.
12. While permission to appeal is usually given by a single judge, appeals
against conviction and sentence are generally heard by three experi-
enced judges. The Court hears appeals from the Crown Courts of Eng-
land and Wales, while the Crown Courts typically hear appeals from the
Magistrates’ Courts.
13. The majority of the approximately 4,000 applications or appeals each
year concern sentences.
14. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Annual Report 2018-19, https://
www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/LCJ-18-to-19-FINAL-
PDF-1-1.pdf.
15. Home Office. 1994. Criminal Appeals and the Establishment of a Crim-
inal Cases Review Authority: A Discussion Paper. London.
16. The jurisdiction of the Commission extends to the magistrates’ court,
for which a referral would be to the Crown Court, although most of its
applications relate to convictions from the Crown Court, which are
referred back to the Court.
17. Sections 9-12 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995 give the Commission the
power to refer if the case satisfies the section 13 real possibility test but
do not impose a duty to do so. There are circumstances under which
the Commission will choose not to refer a case back to the Court even if
it meets the real possibility test. For example, it might be influenced by
the age of the case or the fact that the applicant is deceased.
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Commission is required to consider how the Court will
respond to a referral, its decision-making is inextricably
linked to the test subsequently applied by the Court. Set
out in section 2 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, this
test is simply whether or not the conviction is ‘unsafe’;
the Court does not need to be satisfied that the applicant
is innocent. These principles were stated most explicitly
in the case of Hickey in 1997, the year the Commission
was established:
This court is not concerned with guilt or innocence
of the appellants, but only with the safety of their
convictions. This may, at first sight, appear an unsat-
isfactory state of affairs, until it is remembered that
the integrity of the criminal process is the most
important consideration for the courts which have to
hear appeals against conviction. Both the innocent
and the guilty are entitled to fair trials. (per Roch U,
R v. Hickey18)
In deciding which cases fit the criteria for a referral back
to the Court, the Commission must work within both
the 1968 (section 23) and the 1995 (section 13) Criminal
Appeal Acts. Section 13 of the 1995 Act sets out the
conditions for making a reference: most notably, that
there is ‘new’ evidence or argument – for example, on a
point of law – not previously raised at trial or appeal,
that raises a real possibility that the Court will quash the
conviction (though the Commission can refer a case
without new evidence under ‘exceptional circum-
stances’) (section 13(1)(b)(i)). In other words, the case
must pass a threshold; there must be something ‘fresh’
as well as persuasive. Similarly, if the application relates
to a sentence there must be ‘an argument on a point of
law, or information’ that has not been raised previously
(section 13(1)(b)(ii).5). In all cases, an appeal should
have been determined, or leave to appeal against it
refused, before the convicted person applies to the
Commission (section 13(1)(c)), although the Commis-
sion can consider an application that does not meet this
criterion in ‘exceptional circumstances’.
The Court must consider that it is ‘necessary or expedi-
ent in the interests of justice’ to receive the new evid-
ence within the criteria set out in section 23 of the 1968
Act: the evidence must be capable of belief, capable of
forming a ground for allowing the appeal, and there
must be a reasonable explanation for the failure to
adduce the evidence at trial if the evidence had been
available to the defence at the time (section 2d). By way
of illustration, in the oft-cited case of Steven Jones, the
Court clarified the application of section 23, warning
against the presentation of better expert witnesses at
appeal whose evidence could have been given at trial:
[The appellant] is not entitled to hold evidence in
reserve and then seek to introduce it on appeal following
conviction. While failure to give a reasonable explana-
tion for failure to adduce the evidence before a jury is
18. [1997] EWCA Crim. 2028.
not a bar to reception of the evidence on appeal, it is a
matter which the Court is obliged to consider in decid-
ing whether to receive the evidence or not … Expert
witnesses, although inevitably varying in standing and
experience, are interchangeable in a way in which factu-
al witnesses are not. It would clearly subvert the trial
process if a defendant, convicted at trial, were to be gen-
erally free to mount on appeal an expert case which, if
sound, could and should have been advanced before the
jury. (Steven Jones19)
Given that section 2(1) of the 1968 Act provides that the
Court shall allow an appeal against conviction only if it
thinks that the conviction is unsafe, meeting the real
possibility test requires the Commission to assess
whether the Court is likely to find the conviction to be
unsafe when presented with new argument or new evid-
ence. Hence, in deciding whether there is new evidence
and whether that evidence gives rise to a real possibility
that the Court will find the conviction to be unsafe, the
Commission must consider not only the legislation, but
also subsequent guidance from the Court – on cases
referred by the Commission, as well as on direct appeal
judgments – as well as decisions made by the Adminis-
trative Court in judicial reviews of the Commission’s
decisions not to refer. This guidance – provided by
judgments and occasional reprimands from the
Court20 – is regularly reviewed by the Commission and
reproduced with analysis in Casework Guidance Notes;
in internal memos on Court judgments; in the ‘State-
ments of Reasons’ either to refer or not to refer a case,
prepared for applicants and the Court; and in informal
communication between Commission staff. As Keith
Hawkins might put it, these are the routine ways in
which decision makers create ‘decision fields’ to make
sense of evolving interpretations of the law.21
The first challenge to the Commission’s decision not to
refer a conviction to the Court (in the case of Pearson22)
led to an important judgment by Lord Bingham that
elucidated the Commission’s role in deciding whether
any particular case meets the real possibility test, having
a lasting impact on the Commission’s decision-making:
The real possibility test … is imprecise but plainly
denotes a contingency which, in the Commission’s
judgement, is more than an outside chance or a bare
possibility but which may be less than a probability or a
likelihood or a racing certainty … The Commission is
19. [1997] 1 Cr App R 86. The Court has since demonstrated some flexibili-
ty on this matter. In R v. Soloman the fact that the evidence had been
available and could have been raised at trial did not prove fatal to the
appeal as the evidence was particularly strong ([2007] EWCA Crim
2633).
20. For example, the Court has sought to place limitations on the Commis-
sion in relation to referrals on ‘lurking doubt’, where there is no new
evidence, and very old cases. Furthermore, it has reprimanded the
Commission for certain referrals based on a change of law or on asser-
tions of legal incompetence.
21. K. Hawkins, Law as Last Resort: Prosecution Decision-Making in a Reg-
ulatory Agency (2002), at 50-1.
22. R v. Criminal Cases Review Commission ex p Pearson [1999] 3 All ER
498.
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entrusted with the power and the duty to judge which
cases cross the threshold and which do not … In a con-
viction case depending on the reception of fresh evid-
ence, the Commission must ask itself a double question:
do we consider that if the reference is made there is a
real possibility that the Court of Appeal will receive the
fresh evidence? If so, do we consider that there is a real
possibility that the Court of Appeal will not uphold the
conviction? The Commission would not in such a case
refer unless it gave an affirmative answer to both ques-
tions.
Returning to the case in hand, Pearson, Lord Bingham
continued:
The Commission had, bearing in mind the statutory
threshold, to try to predict the response of the Court
of Appeal if the case were referred and application to
adduce the evidence were made. It could only make
that prediction by paying attention to what the Court
of Appeal had said and done in similar cases on
earlier occasions. It could not rationally predict the
response of the Court of Appeal without making its
own assessment, with specific reference to the mater-
ial in this case, of the considerations to which the
Court of Appeal would be obliged to have regard and
of how it would be likely to exercise its discretion.
(Lord Bingham, R v. Criminal Cases Review Commis-
sion ex p Pearson23)
Hence, the Administrative Court refused the application
from Pearson, reluctant to usurp the function that
Parliament had deliberately accorded to the judgment of
the Commission.
With Pearson in mind, the Commission’s internal guid-
ance on the real possibility test makes clear that com-
missioners should give each case proper scrutiny before
deciding whether the test is met. It reproduces Lord
Bingham’s words, noting that there must be more than
an outside chance of success but that there does not
have to be a probability; that referrals must be more
than threadbare but that success need not be assured. It
also makes clear that the Commission, in second-guess-
ing the Court, must be cognisant of the Court’s deci-
sions in previous cases. Hence, the Commission regular-
ly conducts careful analysis of the Court’s reactions to
its referrals to better predict its responses to future
cases. In other words, it draws on its ‘surround’ to con-
struct its own ‘decision field’.24
Both the Court in its judgments and the Commission in
its Statements of Reasons draw heavily on the House of
Lords’25 judgment in Pendleton.26 Following a referral
by the Commission, Pendleton’s conviction was upheld,
with the Court asserting that the criminal justice system
23. [1999] 3 All ER 498.
24. Hawkins, above n. 21.
25. In October 2009, the House of Lords was replaced by the Supreme
Court as the final court of appeal in the UK for civil cases and for crim-
inal cases from England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
26. R v. Pendleton [2001] UKHL 66 [2002] 1 WLR 72 (HL).
requires trial by jury and not a second trial by judges in
the Court. Notwithstanding deference to the jury, the
Lords subsequently quashed the conviction. Drawing
on prior case law, they argued that in making a judge-
ment on whether a conviction is unsafe, the Court
should test its provisional view by asking whether the
evidence if given at trial might reasonably have affected
the decision of the jury to convict. If it might, the con-
viction must be thought to be unsafe. While the House
of Lords in Pendleton did not change the law, it remind-
ed the Court that in difficult cases it should consider
what doubts the jury might have had.
Since Pendleton the Commission, in deciding its cases,
has asked itself whether the new evidence takes the case
into the realms of ‘difficulty’, as discussed by Lord
Bingham, and has not assumed that the prosecution at
trial had made out an incontrovertible case. In other
words, the Commission is guided by anticipation of how
the judges might consider what a jury would have made
of any new evidence, what the jury might have thought
is sufficient to quash a conviction or order a retrial.
Post-Pendleton jurisprudence appears to set the bar
somewhat higher for the Commission and, more recent-
ly, the Commission has found itself on the receiving end
of sharp rebukes by the Court for its weaker referrals.
Consequently, some have argued that the Commission
has become somewhat ‘timid’ in deciding which cases
meet the test for a referral ‘without it adopting an
explicit policy to that effect or even necessarily appreci-
ating that its approach has been changing’.27
The legal framework of statute and evolving case law
leave some room for discretion, for different approaches
to cases, and for bolder or more cautious decisions on
referring cases back to the Court. In considering post-
conviction review in practice, the following section con-
siders how the Commission’s analysis of case law struc-
tures responses to applications from receipt through to
the decision of whether or not to refer an applicant’s
case back to the Court and how different commissioners
and caseworkers interpret and respond to cases in the




Since the Commission started work in 1997, when it
inherited over 200 cases from C3, it has received 26,221
applications from people, often prisoners, who believe
themselves to be wrongfully convicted and/or sen-
tenced.28 While applications to the Commission were
typically fewer than 1,000 a year, since the launch of a
27. L. Elks, Righting Miscarriages of Justice? Ten Years of the Criminal
Cases Review Commission (2008), at 71.
28. This figure refers to applications received between April 1997 and
March 2010 (retrieved from the Commission’s website on
31 May 2020).
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simplified application form in 2012 and a concurrent
increase in prison ‘outreach’ visits by the Commission,
that figure has risen to approximately 1,400 to 1,500 a
year. The Commission has so far referred approximately
3% of cases (692 cases) back to the appeal courts; 670
cases have been heard by the appeal courts, and of these,
appeals were allowed in 450 cases.29 Given that most
referrals are for serious offences,30 the release from a
conviction, and often a prison sentence for hundreds of
people over the lifetime of the Commission, is to be
commended. However, with a typical 3%-4% referral
rate – which has in the past years dropped to a remarka-
bly low referral rate of 0.8% in 2016-2017 and 0.9% in
2018-2019, almost all of those who apply to the Com-
mission do not find relief.
Making difficult decisions about which cases, and when,
to refer back to the Court requires the Commission to
make sense of the Court’s likely approach to new cases
by examining its response to past referrals. But it also
necessitates the Commission being mindful of how it
could, in turn, try to shape the Court’s evolving juris-
prudence. This section considers how the Commission
responds to its many applications. In so doing, it is
attentive to ‘the space … between legal rules where legal
actors must exercise choice’31 and draws on the work of
sociolegal scholars who consider the interdependent
roles of sociological and legal influences on discretionary
decision-making within criminal justice institutions.32
Analysis is cognisant of how legal frameworks structure
decision-making but mindful too of the sociological fac-
tors that shape discretion, not least the values and
beliefs of those who work in justice organisations. As
Lacey makes clear, we must consider the ‘operational
ideologies’, ‘frames of reference’ or ‘assumptive worlds’
that help decision makers to make sense of and to
impose explanations on their cases.33
This approach does not necessarily mirror the percep-
tions of Commission staff who have somewhat positivist
assumptions about their decision-making, believing it to
be guided and restricted only by the relevant legislation,
not least the real possibility test, and the evolving Court
jurisprudence. As one Commissioner explained, ‘We
have to look at each case distinguished on its own facts,
and obviously, we need to read what’s coming out of the
Court of Appeal so we understand their thinking [if]
there’s a real possibility.’34 Staff also recognise that they
are influenced in their decision-making by policies
imposed by the Commission in the form of Casework
Guidance Notes and Formal Memoranda and in other
institutional directives aimed at helping them to
29. These figures were retrieved from the Commission’s website on
31 May 2020.
30. Approximately 22% for homicide; 18% for sexual offences; 12% for
robberies and other serious, mostly indictable-only offences.
31. K. Hawkins, ‘The Use of Legal Discretion: Perspectives from Law and
Social Science’, in K. Hawkins (ed.), The Uses of Discretion (1992) 11,
at 11.
32. N. Lacey, ‘The Jurisprudence of Discretion: Escaping the Legal Para-
digm’, in K. Hawkins (ed.), The Uses of Discretion (1992) 361.
33. Ibid., at 364.
34. Interview (74) with Commissioner.
recognise and review appropriately those cases that may
meet the real possibility test. Although many do not
recognise the role of culture or individual predisposi-
tions in decision-making, their assumptions are that
decisions about whether to refer a case back to the Court
are made simply on the merits of a case, and therefore
that two different members of the Commission would
likely come to the same conclusion if presented with the
same evidence. As one interviewee told us, ‘when you
refer a case … You try and decide it on its merits’.35
Except as David Nelken reminds us, ‘legal actors often
have little grasp of the factors which shape “inputs” and
“outcomes” of their decisions’.36
More helpful is a naturalist approach to understanding
decision-making, one that recognises that decisions are
not self-evident; that what is ‘merited’ is context sensi-
tive and open to interpretation in each case.37 In this
regard, there will sometimes be different approaches
and outcomes in apparently similar cases. Indeed, Haw-
kins questions what it might mean to consider a case ‘on
its merits’. What merits self-evidently determine out-
comes, and how are they determined?38 Naturalistic
approaches acknowledge the context and social world in
which discretion is exercised.39 In Law as Last Resort,
Hawkins suggests that to understand the nature of dis-
cretionary decision-making, a connection ought to be
made between a range of factors in the decision-making
environment and the decision-making processes in
which individuals engage.40 His typology of ‘surround’,
‘decision fields’ and decision ‘frames’ allows this con-
nection to be made:
Decisions about legal standards and their enforce-
ment, like other legal decisions, are made, then, in a
much broader setting (their “surround”) and within a
context, or “field”, defined by the legal and organiza-
tional mandate. Decision “frames”, the interpretive
and classificatory devices operating in particular
instances, are influenced by both surround and
field.41
Emerson and Paley similarly note that organisational
horizons condition decision-making, as agents are
expected to have a working knowledge of how other
cases of the same nature would be approached, as well as
the implications of allowing the case to proceed to the
next stage of the criminal process.42 In this regard, anal-
35. Interview (40) with Commissioner.
36. D. Nelken, ‘Blind Insights? The Limits of a Reflexive Sociology of Law’,
25(3) Journal of Law and Society 407-26, at 407-8 (1998).
37. For a discussion of positivism and naturalism, and the key differences
between them, see R. Keat, ‘Positivism, Naturalism, and Anti-Natural-
ism in the Social Sciences’, 1(1) Journal for the Theory of Social Behav-
iour 3-17 (1971).
38. K. Hawkins, Law as Last Resort: Prosecution Decision-Making in a Reg-
ulatory Agency (2002), at 31.
39. K. Hawkins, ‘On Legal Decision-Making’, 43(4) Lee Law Review
1161-1242 (1986).
40. Hawkins, above n. 38.
41. Ibid., at 47-8.
42. R.M. Emerson and B. Paley, ‘Organizational Horizons and Complaint-
Filing’, in K. Hawkins (ed.), The Uses of Discretion (1992) 231-48.
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ysis must look beyond the explicit rationales for refer-
ring cases back to the Court and be cognisant of how
commissioners and caseworkers make sense of their
knowledge about past cases in order to infer from those
cases how the Court will respond to a referral in a par-
ticular case. They have first to work out what was ‘really
going on’ in similar cases and what the implications are
of that analysis for future cases.43 Hence, while case law
from the Court might be considered in terms of Haw-
kins’ ‘surround’, once the Commission reacts to evolv-
ing Court jurisprudence, by discussing such cases in its
informal and formal guidance to Commission staff,
those cases become an integral part of the decision field.
By way of example, we turn to consider the Commis-
sion’s initial response to applications, what we might
refer to as its ‘screening’ process before moving on to
consider its decision-making in investigating applica-
tions concerning procedural irregularities. We see in
both analyses that the field structures decision-making
but leaves discretionary gaps for caseworkers to inter-
pret and respond differently.
3.1 Application Screening: Variability in
Decision Frames
The Commission’s case screening produces a high rate
of attrition. It subjects just over half of its 1,400-1,500
applications a year to full and thorough investigation,
rejecting the others with minimal review. This process
causes some anxiety within the Commission, given that
among those screened out there may be innocent people.
Owing to limited resources, the Commission cannot
conduct in-depth reviews of all applications and so
relies on minimal information provided, or gathered, to
make difficult judgments.
Many commissioners identified the real possibility test
as the legal ‘field’ shaping their screening decisions:
‘We’re all independent commissioners from different
backgrounds but there’s one job to do: to see, on the
evidence and facts, if there’s anything new to give rise to
a real possibility.’44 Nonetheless, some acknowledged
the influence of individual characteristics on how they
framed the information received from applicants:
‘[Commissioners] bring a lot of their own previous
experience with them, so … you’re going to get differ-
ent approaches, and that’s a good thing, in many
respects … But on the flip side of that, [it] can then lead
to, obviously, different approaches and inconsisten-
cies.’45 Indeed, our interviews across the Commission
identified a variety of decision-making styles, which
ranged from ‘inflexible conservative’ to ‘very liberal’,
from ‘exploratory’ to ‘decisive’, ‘slow’ to ‘fast’ and from
‘rigorous’ to ‘less careful’. Interviews with staff revealed
concerns about inconsistency in approaches: ‘I get
alarmed sometimes. All our commissioners are very
individual people and they all have quite strong person-
43. R.M. Emerson, ‘Case Processing and Interorganizational Knowledge:
Detecting the “Real Reasons” for Referrals’, 38(2) Social Problems
198-212 (1991).
44. Interview (74) with Commissioner.
45. Interview (70) with Commissioner.
alities, but that does lead to a measure of inconsistency
of approach.’46
Although the legal framework is clear that the Commis-
sion is a last resort for those who have not found relief at
direct appeal, applications from persons who have not
already appealed are not uncommon, making up about
40% of applications each year. Section 13(2) of the
Criminal Appeal Act 1995 allows the Commission to
review such cases and to make a reference ‘if it appears
to the Commission that there are exceptional circum-
stances which justify making it’. All otherwise eligible
cases where there has been no direct appeal will be con-
sidered by commissioners and caseworkers responsible
for screening, as the decision about whether there are
‘exceptional circumstances’ is complex. The Formal
Memorandum states: ‘It is vital that the Commission
does not, other than for compelling reasons, usurp the
conventional appeals process,’ in recognition of the
impact that will have on those who have already satisfied
the previous appeal criterion and will be waiting in the
queue. Hence, it claims, ‘[A] decision by the Commis-
sion to review or to refer any “no-appeal” case will be
unusual.’
Commissioners involved in screening during the first
years of my fieldwork appeared to interpret the
guidelines liberally.47 Furthermore, I found some varia-
bility among those responsible for screening, in that
some cautious commissioners ‘screened in’ half of the
cases, while others rejected most. For example, between
2010 and 2013, one commissioner, ‘Commissioner 1’,
screened twenty-eight cases and found one case with
potential exceptional circumstances, while another,
‘Commissioner fifteen’, screened twenty-eight cases and
found fourteen cases with potential exceptional circum-
stances. No significant differences were found in the
profile of cases these two commissioners were responsi-
ble for screening in terms of applicants’ gender, custody
status, type of offence or when the applications were
received. While wider analysis of screening decisions
suggested that commissioners could be influenced by
guilty pleas and by good legal representation at applica-
tion, albeit to different degrees, the variability in prac-
tice, overall, was difficult to account for. Clearly, not-
withstanding a coherent decision field, decision makers
were influenced by individual decision frames – ways of
making sense of the information – reflecting their par-
ticular personalities.
3.2 Investigating Cases: Variability in Decision
Frames
The Commission commits considerable resources to
searching for fresh arguments or evidence in those cases
where the relatively superficial screening of an applica-
tion suggests that there are reasons to doubt the safety
of the conviction. Decisions about reviewing cases are
not made in a vacuum; the Commission influences deci-
sion-making by creating and providing knowledge to
46. Interview (17) with Commissioner.
47. More recently, the Commission has become more restrictive in its inter-
pretation of exceptional circumstances.
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draw on, as set out, and regularly revised, in its internal
guidelines for staff. Notwithstanding this clear decision
field, my research found a wide range of investigative
patterns and behaviours across the Commission, by way
of different decision frames, that could not be accounted
for by the types of cases or by the experience of the
investigative staff.
Most applicants, even those with legal representation,
do not have access to all the records from the trial, and
so the first stage of any review is to collate and analyse
relevant material for the investigation from public bod-
ies, such as the health service, the police and the Courts,
and – since 2016 –from private bodies and individuals.48
Beyond these vital ‘desktop reviews’, in some cases it is
considered to be advantageous to conduct empirical
investigations: to interview the applicant, a witness or an
expert and perhaps conduct other investigatory work,
including commissioning forensic analysis.
Making sense of applications and deciding what investi-
gations to carry out is a complex process, guided by
more than the law; other structural and cultural varia-
bles, such as resources and even the personalities of the
caseworkers, inform the process and introduce inevita-
ble variability across cases. Analysis of investigatory
behaviour over a particular year revealed that one case-
worker conducted no empirical investigations, while
another did fourteen separate empirical investigations in
the same time, with a range of approaches between these
two. Case analysis also revealed considerable differences
in the speed of reviews at each stage of the process, vari-
ability that could only in part be accounted for by the
nature or complexity of the case or by the responsive-
ness of persons external to the Commission. Those we
interviewed felt that some of the variation could be
accounted for by the intelligence and expertise of case-
workers and commissioners but also by their personali-
ties, confidence and dynamism.
While guidelines cover all aspects of the commission’s
work, of particular interest to us here is guidance on
decision-making throughout reviews, principally on the
question of whether the case satisfies the real possibility
test. Discretion may be exercised by individual decision
makers slightly differently for each case in the context of
past judgments handed down by the Court as well as by
the Commission’s interpretation of the factors that
influenced those judgments and a set of ever-shifting
understandings of the persuasiveness of certain evidence
in a particular context at a particular time. By way of a
case study of decision-making, we now turn to consider
the Commission’s response to applications that raise
concerns about police and prosecution procedural irreg-
ularities to show how this works in practice.
3.3 Decision-Making in Cases Raising Due
Process Concerns
The three main issues raised in applications to the Com-
mission are concerns about the credibility of the witness
48. Section 17 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995; section 18A of the Criminal
Cases Review Commission (Information) Act 2016.
or complainant, incompetent representation and claims
of police or prosecutorial misconduct.49 The criminal
justice process is operated by fallible and sometimes
prejudiced individuals, and criminal trials provide
‘imperfect procedural justice’.50 Wrongful convictions
are therefore inevitable. Indeed, to a greater or lesser
extent, all applications to the Commission raise con-
cerns about the reliability of the evidence presented to
the trial court or about flaws in criminal procedure.
As the Commission must be mindful of the Court’s
evolving jurisprudence in deciding how to investigate its
cases and when a case is sufficiently strong for a referral
back to the Court, it relies on Casework Guidance Notes
to steer commissioners in their reviews: documents not
publicly available but that I have analysed. As regards
applications claiming procedural impropriety, the Com-
mission is aware that the Court is becoming increasingly
disinclined to quash convictions based solely on proce-
dural irregularities. Evolving jurisprudence suggests a
sea change in the Commission’s ‘surround’, to use Haw-
kins’ term, to a position whereby the Court seeks to
establish whether procedural failures ‘caused any preju-
dice to any of the parties, such as to make it unjust to
proceed further’.51 In other words, the Commission
knows that the approach of the Court is not to presume
that breaches of due process are determinative in them-
selves and that it ‘routinely applies the safety test in the
light of its overall sense of justice and not on the basis of
technicalities’.52 This inclination in the Commission’s
surround inevitably influences its ‘decision field’, as the
Commission tries to predict which cases may be accept-
ed by the Court and which are likely to fail the test.
Drawing on the recent trends in the Court’s judgments,
Casework Guidance Notes advise Commission staff on
responding to cases of police misconduct or material
non-disclosure (of potentially exculpatory evidence) that
might undermine the credibility of a case to such an
extent that it amounts to an abuse of process. They
make clear that the primary concern of the Court is how
evidence of misconduct might have affected the jury’s
decision to convict the applicant, or the judge’s decision
on a legal ruling. In other words, evidence of police mis-
conduct ‘should not be viewed as determinative’ in itself
but should rather be considered in light of the overrid-
ing question of how it impacts on the safety of the con-
viction; that had police investigated thoroughly and
behaved with probity, the jury may not have convicted
the applicant. In making those crucial decisions about
whether evidence of improper policing is determina-
tive – whether it is sufficiently strong to impact on the
safety of the conviction – the Commission must inter-
49. S. Heaton, ‘A Critical Evaluation of the Utility of Using Innocence as a
Criterion in the Post-Conviction Process’ (PhD Thesis, University of East
Anglia), at 32 (2013).
50. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), at 85.
51. Clark and McDaid Court judgment [2006] EWCA Crim 1196, cited in
Criminal Cases Review Commission. 2006b. ‘Quashing Convictions’:
The Responses of the Criminal Cases Review Commission (11 Decem-
ber 2006), para. 19.
52. Ibid., para. 25.
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pret each case, with its unique set of factors, in light of
the evolving Court jurisprudence.
A few of the cases I examined involved breaches of due
process of significant severity and import to justify a
referral back to the Court. One applicant had been con-
victed of an attempted rape and of a burglary with intent
to rape solely on his false confession, although there was
no positive identification from either of the victims and
no forensic evidence linking him to either the scene of
crime or the victims. Moreover, there was an alternative
suspect. Following an application to the Commission in
2000, an experienced forensic psychologist was commis-
sioned to examine the applicant and could demonstrate
that he was ‘highly suggestible’, casting doubt on the
veracity of the confession. The Commission referred the
case back to the Court with this fresh expert evidence –
 which afforded the information about the alternative
suspect higher evidential status – and on the further
ground that the police had acted without integrity. The
Commission’s Statement of Reasons for a referral poin-
ted out that the police had done very little investigation
into the offences – indeed had failed to do the basics –
 and that the jury had been provided with an abridged
version of the interview transcripts, which would have
been misleading. Furthermore, the applicant had not
been provided with a lawyer. The Court quashed the
conviction on the basis of the expert witness’ ‘serious
reservations about the reliability of the self-incriminat-
ing admissions [the applicant] made to the police’,
despite the initial guilty plea. This was a reasonably
straightforward case, and it is likely that any commis-
sioner would have made the same decision about refer-
ral.
In many of those cases where the Commission refused
to refer the case to the Court although applicants had
raised concerns about police misconduct, evidence of
misconduct or non-disclosure was not fresh, the defence
had failed to adduce it at trial or the evidence was not
determinative, the legal parameters that the Commis-
sion must operate within. The thrust of the advice in
the Casework Guidance Note on non-disclosure is that
the Commission should consider whether the undis-
closed evidence may have been material to the issues in
the case and seek to understand its significance in the
context of the case as a whole. Hence, again, commis-
sioners would be likely to respond fairly consistently to
such cases. As one commissioner explained, ‘It’s not
non-disclosure per se that makes something meritori-
ous. It’s always the sort of back-story as to why it wasn’t
used before. So, I can see where the Court of Appeal are
coming from because it always is based on the signifi-
cance of the material rather than the mechanics of how
or why it didn’t come about.’53
In most cases, police misconduct identified by the Com-
mission was not thought to meet the threshold whereby
it could be said to impact on the safety of the conviction
within a legal decision frame. As explicated by one
Statement of Reasons not to refer, an application cannot
53. Interview (1) with Commissioner.
be referred simply on the basis that the investigation fell
short of the standards, but the Commission ‘would have
to be satisfied that if there was any inadequacy and/or
misconduct in the investigation its effect impacted upon
the safety of the conviction’. Similarly, in another case,
the applicant’s claims of police incompetence were
deemed to be insufficient: ‘Investigative failures would
not be sufficient in themselves to cause the Court of
Appeal to quash the conviction … there would need to
be specific matters arising from such failures that affect-
ed the trial process to a degree that rendered it unsafe.
(Statement of Reasons)’ Case analysis in most such cases
similarly made clear that to refer a case back to the
Court, breaches of disclosure rules – like breaches of the
police codes of practice – must be sufficiently egregious,
or the Commission must be able to demonstrate that
had the material been disclosed to the defence, it would
have made a difference to the outcome of the case.
Within the wider decision field, Commission staff
adopted different decision frames in order to make sense
of cases and to arrive at difficult decisions about refer-
rals. While a legal decision frame was dominant, they
also adopted, in some cases, instrumental or moral deci-
sion frames. Although they referred back to the Court
those cases demonstrating flagrant breaches of due pro-
cess, there were a few examples of Commission deci-
sion-making that demonstrated variable levels of defer-
ence to police and prosecutors. Such cases suggested
either a moral decision to trust in the integrity of the
pre-trial process or moral values concerned with due
process being trumped by common-sense understand-
ings of the inevitable shortcomings inherent in an over-
burdened criminal justice system. Hence, one commis-
sioner described the failings of a senior investigating
police officer in one of his cases in terms of a heavy case-
load: ‘I think it’s easy to sit back in our sort of ivory
tower here and be hyper-critical. … But I think [the
senior investigating police officer] himself, you know, I
do have a lot of sympathy for him because it was a diffi-
cult case.’
Other interviewees dismissed inadequate investigations
by the police as merely ‘mistakes’, or ‘shortcomings in
the investigation with no evidence of the police acting in
bad faith’, with one Statement of Reasons suggesting
‘police officers might have unknowingly implanted
incorrect information in the witnesses’ minds’ (empha-
sis added), and a commissioner in another case explain-
ing:
There’s no sense that there’s been deliberate, you know,
impropriety either on behalf of the police or the prose-
cution. In my experience, it’s just been a cock up, you
know, that things have been missed and particularly that
police … have just not recognized the significance of a
piece of information or material, generally to the case …
I think it’s just … error, mistake … incompetence …
negligence, whatever you want to call it.54
Few wanted to call it misconduct and were perhaps,
therefore, less likely to see mischief when reviewing
54. Interview (29) with Commissioner.
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police investigations. It is arguable that the Commission
has been a little too complacent here, in assuming that
institutionalised corruption and misconduct by police is
rare.
In considering the Commission’s response to these
cases, we can see the relevance of Hawkins’ work and
that of other sociolegal scholars who have looked beyond
the law in trying to understand the exercise of discretion
at all stages of the criminal process. The Commission’s
decision-making demonstrates that the surround is not
static. It shifts according to wider social and political
changes beyond the institution, and when it does, the
Commission will typically need to move with it. Case
analysis demonstrated that developments in the sur-
round require consequent paradigm shifts in the
‘field’ – in the policies and guidelines of the Commis-
sion developed to reflect both the dictates of and the lat-
itude within the law – and, as we see above, in the
‘frame’, how commission staff make sense of infor-
mation; how they interpret, classify and respond to
evidence in their cases, with a few inclined to be rather
forgiving of police and prosecution incompetence.55
My research in these cases, as in others, demonstrated
that the Court’s prior response to Commission referrals
and to direct appeals clearly impacts on the Commis-
sion’s decision-making. Hence, despite some room for
different interpretations, and therefore for some varia-
bility in responses across the Commission, this inevita-
bly locks the Commission into a close, deferential rela-
tionship with the Court. It requires the Commission, as
an institution, to accurately interpret the Court’s deci-
sions in order to guide decision makers, and then Com-
mission staff must correctly interpret the guidance and
apply it appropriately. Notwithstanding this room for
discretion, there is a close relationship between the
Commission and the Court, and this creates certain
challenges, to which we now turn.
4 Challenges: Jury Deference
and Deference to the Court
While the Commission remains determined to examine
each application thoroughly for post-conviction review,
it does so with inadequate resources56 and within a
legislative framework that restricts its independence and
a culture that I have observed to be somewhat risk
averse. I explore the culture of the Commission else-
where57 but here return to the legislation that shapes the
Commission’s response to applications and creates an
intractable challenge.
55. K. Hawkins, Law as Last Resort: Prosecution Decision-Making in a Reg-
ulatory Agency (2002), at 49.
56. House of Commons Justice Committee. Justice—12th Report: Criminal
Cases Review Commission HC850 (2015), http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmjust/
850/85002.htm.
57. Hoyle and Sato, above n. 9.
The real possibility test inevitably restricts the Commis-
sion’s ability to refer a possible wrongful conviction
back to the Court and obliges the Commission to decide
whether the Court will likely find the conviction to be
unsafe. Hence, indirectly, decisions within the Commis-
sion are influenced by the Court of Appeal and the
Administrative Court, by way of evolving case law. For
that reason, many criticisms of the Commission stem
from the nexus created by section 13 of the Criminal
Appeal Act 1995 because it creates the conditions
whereby if the Court is wrong in its analysis or judg-
ment, the Commission is required to sustain erroneous
jurisprudence. Given that there is some evidence that
the Court is becoming more reluctant to overturn juries’
decisions, this must be of concern to critics who consid-
er the Commission to be insufficiently bold in its refer-
ral decisions.
4.1 Court Deference to the Jury?
The Court has long harboured a deeply felt reluctance
to overturn convictions,58 in part because of its commit-
ment to the supremacy of the jury.59 This deference led
the human rights organisation JUSTICE to criticise the
Court’s failure to overturn jury verdicts in its 1964
report, stressing ‘the fallibility and inexperience of jur-
ies whose verdicts do not warrant such reverential treat-
ment by appeal court judges’.60 Thirty years later, Mal-
leson reviewed the first 300 appeals against conviction of
1990 and found that in only very limited circumstances
was fresh evidence admitted by the Court and that when
admitted only rarely did it form the basis for a success-
ful appeal.61 The Court is reluctant to disturb a jury’s
verdict in part because it has not heard the evidence
they heard nor seen the witnesses. Showing deference to
the jury allows the Court to resist appeals based solely
on the grounds that the jury could have reached a differ-
ent verdict.62
New research suggests that the Court today may be
more deferential to the jury than ever. Roberts – using
the same research method as Malleson (analysing the
first 300 available appeals considered in 2016) – found
almost double the number of appeals based on fresh
evidence, which may hint at a more liberal approach by
the Court today.63 However, in only 19% of her cases
did the Court admit the fresh evidence, significantly
lower than the 61% in 1990.64 This suggests the Court
is now more restrictive. Her research also found that the
most common reason for rejecting fresh evidence under
section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 was that the
58. A. Zuckerman, ‘Miscarriage of Justice and Judicial Responsibility’, Crim-
inal Law Review 492-500 (1991).
59. Nobles and Schiff, above n. 6, at 310.
60. JUSTICE cited in Nobles and Schiff, above n. 6, at 310.
61. K. Malleson, Review of the Appeal Process, RCCJ Research Study No
17 (1993).
62. R. Nobles and D. Schiff, ‘The Right to Appeal and Workable Systems of
Justice’, 65(5) Modern Law Review 676-701, at 676 (2002).
63. S. Roberts, ‘Fresh Evidence and Factual Innocence in the Criminal Divi-
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evidence had been available at trial and there was no rea-
sonable explanation as to why it was not adduced then (a
challenge I saw the Commission grapple with in some
cases). If the Court is deferential to the jury, this neces-
sarily influences the Commission’s decisions about fresh
evidence.
4.2 Commission Deference to the Court?
As the statutory grounds for referral ‘provide strong pri-
ma facie evidence of an essentially dependent position’,65
concerns about deference are frequently expressed.
Critics argue that the centrality of the real possibility
test to the Commission’s work compromises its claim to
independence.66 Some have argued that the Commis-
sion is circumscribed not only by the law, but also by a
concern to please the Court.67 On these points, some
critics are more forceful than others. While some view
the Commission as a filter to the Court,68 others point
out that ‘accusations that the [Commission] is … subor-
dinate to the [Court] are truisms. That is the way that
the system has been designed by Parliament’.69 Nobles
and Schiff see it as inevitable that the Commission
would have developed this relationship even in the
absence of a statutory restriction on its powers.70 Given
that the Commission has no independent power to
quash convictions – but can only refer cases to the
Court – it is deterred from making referrals that, in view
of the Court’s practices, would only fail.71 It is always in
the realm of second-guessing how the Court may assess
a case following a referral and anticipating how readily
the Court will accept its new arguments.72
Regardless of the legislative inevitability of the close
predictive nexus between the Commission and the
Court, friends and critics have worried about it being
overly submissive:
[I]t has been suggested that the Commission has been
somewhat intimidated in some cases by the Court’s
approach … And has wrongly concluded that the
Court would refuse to receive improved expert evid-
ence on the basis of ‘finality of trial’ considerations. If
65. P. Duff, ‘Straddling Two Worlds: Reflections of a Retired Criminal Cases
Review Commissioner’, 72(5) The Modern Law Review 693-722, at
701 (2009).
66. The boldness of this claim should not be underestimated, given that the
raison d’être of the Commission is to be independent; see R. Nobles and
D. Schiff, ‘The Criminal Cases Review Commission: Reporting Success?’
64(2) The Modern Law Review 280-99 (2001).
67. M. Naughton, ‘No Champion of Justice’, in J. Robins (ed.), Wrongly
Accused: Who Is Responsible for Investigating Miscarriages of Justice?
The Justice Gap and Solicitors Journal 20-3, at 21 (2012).
68. A. James, ‘The Criminal Cases Review Commission: Economy, Effective-
ness and Justice’, Criminal Law Review 140-53 (2000).
69. K. Kerrigan, ‘Real Possibility or Fat Chance?’ in M. Naughton (ed.), The
Criminal Cases Review Commission: Hope for the Innocent? (2009)
166-77, at 174.
70. Nobles and Schiff, above n. 6.
71. R. Nobles and D. Schiff, ‘The Criminal Cases Review Commission:
Establishing a Workable Relationship with the Court of Appeal’, Crim-
inal Law Review 173-89 (2005).
72. R. Nobles, ‘The CCRC in 2012: An Academic’s View’. Queen Mary
University of London, School of Law, Legal Studies Research Series
No. 119/20 (2012).
the Commission has, indeed, adopted that approach –
 rejecting exposed evidence that significantly
improves upon the expert case at trial – that would be
a serious criticism.73
Of course, a difficulty with Elks’ point is with the
notion of ‘evidence that significantly improves upon the
expert case at trial’. The Commission can struggle with
that subjective judgement. Commissioners not only fol-
low casework guidance but sometimes also await pend-
ing Court judgments in similar cases, or cases that raise
analogous issues, before deciding whether new evidence
is likely to be seen by the Court to significantly improve
on the expert case at trial. In light of those cases, they
decide whether to refer and, if so, on what grounds.
This is unavoidable deference, but it could also be
regarded as a pragmatic use of limited resources; learn-
ing from past judgments to identify evidence that is
likely to be accepted by the Court and to play down fac-
tors that have not proven to be persuasive in the past. In
other words, it is not always clear what is deference and
what is pragmatism, nor is it always clear what is con-
strained by the real possibility test and what is shaped
by a culture of caution or individual predispositions, as
described previously. Of course, if the Court gets it
right, the Commission does too; however, if the Court
gets it wrong, this approach affords no opportunities for
the Commission to correct that. While commissioners
have told me that recent castigations by the Court for its
referrals show that the relationship is not too cosy, its
historically high success rate might demonstrate an
insufficiently bold approach to referrals.
The question of an appropriate success rate has troubled
the Commission for some time. When I began my
research, I put it to commissioners that an almost 70%
success rate was perhaps a little too high and that it sug-
gested the Commission was somewhat risk averse in its
referrals. Recent data – showing a declining referral rate
but also a declining success rate – is therefore confound-
ing. If the current reduced referral rate were to suggest
increasing risk aversion, with the Commission not wish-
ing to be rebuked for audacious referrals based on a
more liberal interpretation of the real possibility test, we
might expect to see a higher rate of referred cases
quashed, regardless of the raw numbers. Instead, the
reduced referral rate has coincided with a reduced suc-
cess rate. In light of this, is it sensible to urge the Com-
mission to be bolder in its referrals?
5 Conclusion: Should the
Commission Be Bolder?
The inevitable ‘second-guessing’ built into the legisla-
tion causes the Commission to be somewhat deferential
to the Court. At the same time, the Court would appear
73. Elks, above n. 27, at 77.
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to be rather deferential to the jury, given its adherence
to the principle of finality. The consistency of data dem-
onstrating the Court’s deference to the jury and the
legislative interdependence of the Court and the Com-
mission raises the question of what, if anything, the
Commission can do to resist being too deferential to the
Court. That may well be one of the key challenges of the
coming decade.
On one level, it makes no sense to object to the Com-
mission being somewhat subordinate to the Court; it is
inevitable given its function as a review body, not a
court of law. However, the Court’s restrictions on
admissibility of evidence (under its section 23 provi-
sions) mean that some potentially unsafe convictions
never get through its doors. Some of my cases were not
referred because the Commission cannot submit evid-
ence if it had been used at trial or at a prior appeal or
had been available but not adduced at trial, and there is
no adequate explanation for this failure. Although the
principle of finality is important, this restriction causes
some unease.
Although the Commission is institutionally deferential
to the Court, it is not powerless to act in those difficult
cases that cause disquiet. At the risk of a lower success
rate, it can choose to be bolder in its referrals, making
use of its powers to refer on ‘lurking doubt’ or bypassing
the system and applying for a Royal Prerogative of Mer-
cy, options that the Commission has expressed little
appetite for in the past.74 More significantly, the Com-
mission could in certain cases push the boundaries of
the real possibility test and make bolder, sometimes
‘contrarian’ referrals. It can do so because of the gaps in
its decision framework that allow for discretion in inter-
pretation and in response to evidence.
My research identified a few such difficult cases and an
appetite for a less cautious approach to referral decisions
among some commissioners.75 While the Commission
has expressed concern about the variability in its
approach across cases, revealed by my research, and has
made efforts to introduce measures to increase consis-
tency, it must nonetheless embrace its limited discretion
and encourage decision makers to take advantage of the
gaps that can facilitate a more assertive approach to
referrals. Although the Commission and the Court must
maintain a reasonably harmonious relationship as the
success of each requires the cooperation of the other, the
relationship could be more challenging and occasionally
combative without unduly compromising its symbiotic
nature. It is not inevitable that the Commission must
always follow the lead.
Currently, in England and Wales, there is considerable
concern about the abilities of an overstretched and
underfunded criminal justice system to protect defend-
ants’ due process rights. It is not unreasonable to
assume that the coming years and decades will see a rise
in the kinds of cases discussed previously, cases where
ineptitude or insufficiency of resources by the police or
74. Hoyle and Sato, above n. 9, at 334-5.
75. Ibid., 335-7.
prosecution will introduce errors that can produce
unsafe convictions. It may therefore be time for the
Commission to test the boundaries of the Court’s past
jurisprudence by referring cases even when it cannot be
demonstrated that the errors were determinative, so long
as they are sufficiently disquieting to suggest they may
be. The variation in approach we saw across the Com-
mission suggests that at least some will have an appetite
for this. As one commissioner told me, ‘I think we could
be bolder … there are cut-and-dried cases, and there’s a
grey area. And I think in the grey area, we ought to lean
more towards referring.’ My research suggests that is a
path worth taking.
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